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Relations among some ethnic communities 
in Kenya have been characterised by deep 
animosity and suspicion, which heighten 
during election periods. This is so largely 
because individuals hailing from a few 
ethnic communities dominated the political 
structures and economic resources of the 
country, to the exclusion of other 
communities, both before and after Kenya 
became an independent country. The 
people in authority used the State 
apparatus to economically benefit 
themselves, their kin, their friends and 
regions. The exclusion was exacerbated as 
the country increasingly became 
centralised, contributing to intermittent 
conflicts, which often occur following 
general elections, the worst being the 2007 
post-election violence. Kenya adopted a 
new Constitution in 2010 with a view, 
among other things, to curbing this decades 
long inter-ethnic animosity.  
       This article argues that the 2010 
Kenyan Constitution by creating 47 
counties, sub-national territorial and 
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political units, has enhanced the opportunities for the political inclusion of hitherto 
excluded communities. Moreover, the 2013 election results show that several 
previously excluded communities not only have become represented at county level, 
but have in fact gained control of one or more of the counties where they form the 
majority. The system of devolution that Kenya adopted has not however entirely done 
away with the possibility of some ethnic communities being excluded. Several ethnic 
communities now form a new minority at intra-county level, since the devolved system 
has not provided a county for each territorially structured ethnic community. Moreover, 
many who have migrated from what traditionally would have been viewed as their 
“home county” to other counties now form intra-county minorities. Practice shows a 
trend in which the communities forming the majority in some counties are excluding 
those who are in the minority in those counties. Furthermore, the national executive 
still retains a significant political and economic clout and hitherto excluded 
communities are not necessarily guaranteed representation in it.  
       The article begins by describing how the pre-2010 centralised system brought 
about the political exclusion of several ethnic communities in Kenya. Then it discusses 
the principles under the 2010 Constitution that recognise the ethnic diversity of the 
Kenyan people and call for their political inclusion. It then deals with the territorial and 
non-territorial institutional mechanisms that the Constitution envisages would be used 
for the purpose of ensuring the inclusion of the various ethnic communities of the 
country.  Finally, based on the 2013 general election results, it examines whether there 
is a trend in the political inclusion of hitherto excluded communities.  
2  HISTORY OF ETHNIC BASED POLITICAL EXCLUSION IN KENYA  
The political exclusion of many ethnic communities in Kenya is the legacy of colonial 
rule and a decades long centralised, ethnicised, and personalised presidential system. 
The presidency was used for the political and material benefit of the holder of the office 
and his close political associates, often belonging to the ethnic community from which 
the president hailed.1  
       The British, as part of their divide and rule colonial policy, chose individuals 
from specific ethnic communities, to the exclusion of others to allow access to the 
country’s political and administrative institutions, as a reward for this collaboration. 
After independence, Jomo Kenyatta, the first Kenyan President, largely maintained the 
colonial political and economic structures, and chose to politically and economically 
empower himself and those, mainly, from his ethnic community - the Kikuyu - to the 
exclusion of others. To this effect he abolished the Independence Constitution that 
provided for a semi-federal political system and centralised all political powers in his 
office.2  He justified the centralisation of powers by the ideal of nation building, a project 
                                                 
1 Kanyinga K “Pluralism, ethnicity and governance in Kenya” in Ghai YP & Cottrell J (eds) Ethnicity, 
nationhood, and pluralism: Kenyan perspectives Ottawa: Global Centre for Pluralism  (2013) 66- 72. 
2 Sundet G & Moen E Political economy analysis of Kenya Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (2009) available at http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-
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that was predicated on a denial of the ethnic diversity of the Kenyan people. Dubbed 
pejoratively “majimboism”, the semi-federal system was viewed as a system that would 
exacerbate the ethnic cleavages of the Kenyan people and sabotage the nation-building 
project3  
       The centralised system however had the opposite effect of ethnic-based 
exclusion and division.  This trend continued under the second President, Daniel Arap 
Moi, who, having assumed the presidency after Kenyatta died in 1978, also used it to 
empower the Kalenjin, an ethnic community to which he belongs.4 Even worse, Moi 
formalised a mono-party political system- which had in any case been the de-facto 
system in Kenya since 1969 - thereby ending any semblance of democratic pluralism in 
the country.5 President Mwai Kibaki, the third President of Kenya, who was also from 
the Kikuyu ethnic group like President Kenyatta, was no exception to this since, having 
assumed the presidency after Moi, he also increasingly preferred his Kikuyu kinsmen in 
political appointments.6 




Kenyatta Moi Kibaki 
1966 1978 1979 2001 2003 2005 
No % No % No % No % No % No % 
Kikuyu 6 28.6 6 28.6 8 30 1 4 4 16 6 18.1 
Luhya 2 9.52 1 4.8 3 11 4 14 4 16 7 21.2 
Luo 3 14.3 3 14.3 3 11 2 7 4 16 1 3.1 
Kamba 1 4.76 2 9.52 2 7.6 4 14 3 12 4 12.1 
Kalenjin - - - - 3 11 5 17 1 4 2 6.1 
Kisii 2 9.20 2 9.52 2 7.6 2 7 0 0 2 6.1 
Meru 1 4.75 1 4.76 1 3.8 1 4 2 8 2 6.1 
Somali - - -  - -   -  -  - 0 0 2 6.1 
Mijikenda 2 9.25 3 14.3 2 7.6 2 7 2 8 3 9.0 
Others 3 14.3 2 9.52 2 7.6 7 25 2 8 4 12.1 
                                                                                                                                                        
am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/political-economy-analysis-of-kenya.pdf 
(accessed 25 September 2015). 
3 Bosire CM (2013) Devolution for development, conflict resolution, and limiting central power: an analysis 
of the constitution of Kenya  (unpublished PhD thesis), University of the Western Cape). 
4 Republic of Kenya Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land‟ 
(2004). 
5 Kindiki K “The emerging jurisprudence on Kenya’s constitutional review law” (2007) 153 (1) Kenya Law 
Review 153. 
6 Romero R “To what extent did ethnicity and economic issues matter in the 2007 disputed Kenyan 
elections?” (2013) 31 (3) Development Policy Review 292. 
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Source: Kanyinga K “Pluralism, ethnicity and governance in Kenya” in Ghai YP & Cottrell J (eds) 
Ethnicity, nationhood, and pluralism: Kenyan perspectives Nairobi: Katiba Institute, (2013) 66, 67, 69, 70, 
72. 
As can be seen from Table 1, during the presidency of Kenyatta, the percentage of 
cabinet ministers from the Kikuyu community was 28.5. However, in 2001 the 
percentage of ministers from the Kikuyu community dropped to just 4% and that of the 
Kalenjin rose to 22 %. Moreover, a maximum of 10 ethnic communities were 
represented in the cabinet of both Kenyatta and Moi out of about 43 ethnic 
communities. The same trend followed in the appointments of the Permanent 
Secretaries (PS). In 1970, for example, the PS from the Kikuyu community constituted 
37.5% while those from the Kalenjin community were just 8.3%. The percentage of the 
PS from the Kikuyu community dropped to 8.7% in 2001 while that of the Kalenjin 
community rose to 34.8%. This was once again reversed when Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, 
came to power in 2001.  
      In short, those holding the presidency effectively entrenched the politics of “it’s 
our turn to eat” in Kenya, leaving other ethnic communities with a feeling of exclusion.7 
In such a centralised and personalised political system, and in the absence of alternative 
sub-national political institutions, controlling the national government, in particular the 
presidency, became a life and death matter for every ethnic community during general 
elections.8  
      There had been sporadic inter-ethnic violent conflicts in what came to be known 
as Kenya even before the emergence of colonialism towards the end of the 19th century. 
The creation of the Kenyan State and the systematic exclusion of the various ethnic 
communities, in particular after independence, however, politicised the conflict to the 
extent that it reached a catastrophic proportion in the aftermath of the 2007 general 
elections.9 The 2007 post-election violence resulted in the death of more than 1,133 
people, displacement of approximately 350 000 others and destruction of property. 10  
       The political exclusion of, and economic discrimination against the various 
ethnic communities, and the urgency to curb these problems triggered persistent 
demands for constitutional reform from the 1980s.11 At the centre of the call for 
constitutional reform was the demand to remove the centralised government system 
and replace it with a decentralised one.  There was an even stronger demand for 
equitable representation in the national government of all regions and communities, 
which had been the domain of a few communities and individuals. These demands could 
not be ignored after the 2007 post-elections violence. Thus serious moves were begun 
                                                 
7 Romero (2013) 292. 
8 Bosire (2013). 
9 South Consulting The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) Monitoring Project: Report on 
status of implementation (2009) available at http://south.co.ke/index.php/projects-and-reports/kndr-
project/2-uncategorised/11-review-reports (accessed 30 November 2016). 
10 Kenya: Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence (CIPEV) Final report (2008) available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/15A00F569813F4D549257607001F459D-
Full_Report.pdf (accessed 22 August 2015).  
11 Kindiki (2007) 153.  
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towards constitutional reform resulting in the adoption of the 2010 Constitution. The 
Constitution, among other things, introduced a devolved system of government, 
composed of 47 counties and a national government. 
        The introduction of the devolved system was predicated, among others, on the 
need to enhance the political and economic inclusion of previously excluded ethnic 
communities.12 Moreover, as per the constitutional prescription, general elections were 
conducted in 2013 in which the President of the Republic, members of parliament, 
members of county assemblies, women representatives, county governors and their 
deputies were elected. This raises two key questions: How does the Constitution seek to 
achieve the political inclusion of hitherto excluded ethnic communities? Have the 2013 
elections brought about the political inclusion that was envisaged by the Constitution?  
3  ETHNIC INCLUSION IN THE 2010 KENYAN CONSTITUTION  
The 2010 Kenyan Constitution contains several principles that aim to bring about the 
political inclusion of all the ethnic communities of Kenya. The first principle in this 
respect is the one that recognises the very existence of diverse ethnic communities in 
Kenya, which had been thus far viewed as a taboo in Kenya’s political discourse. The 
third paragraph of the Preamble of the Constitution therefore recognises the “ethnic, 
cultural and religious diversity” of the Kenyan people. Such recognition is an important 
first step towards mandating “the state to acknowledge the ethnic plurality that 
characterises the society it seeks to govern”.13  
      However, the Constitution does not go much further in terms of boldly giving 
institutional expression to the ethnic diversity of Kenyans, which would have the impact 
of institutionalising ethnicity. This means that unlike, for instance, the Ethiopian or 
South African Constitutions, the Kenyan Constitution does not give an official status to 
the languages of the various ethnic communities both at national and county levels.14  
Nor does it expressly provide, unlike the Ethiopian Constitution,15 for the creation of 
states and sub-state territorial units along ethnic lines.16  In fact, it counterbalances the 
recognition of the ethnic diversity of Kenyans with its emphasis on their unity, by 
stressing their determination to “live in peace and unity as one indivisible sovereign 
nation”. Granting ethnic diversity an institutional expression is still a political taboo that 
the framers of the Constitution could not overcome. Thus the Constitution is mostly 
vague and hazy about the institutional accommodation of ethnic diversity. 
                                                 
12 Republic of Kenya: Kenya Gazette Supplement: Constitution of Kenya Review Act No 9 (2008) Ss 4 (d) 
& (f). 
13 Fessha Y (2010) Ethnic diversity and federalism: constitution making in South Africa and Ethiopia 
Farnham: Ashgate (2010) 19. 
14 See Article 5 of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution (1995); Section 6 (1) of 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 (1996).  
15 FDRE Constitution (1995) Arts 39 (3) & 46 (2).   
16  See Ayele Z A “The politics of sub-national constitutions and local government in Ethiopia” (2014) (6) 
2 Perspectives on Federalism 89-115. 
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      The above however does not mean that the Constitution is completely silent on 
the matter.  It seeks to ensure the political, economic, social, and cultural inclusion of all 
ethnic communities, in particular ethnic minorities. And devolution is the principal 
institutional mechanism that the Constitution seeks to use for this purpose. This can be 
gathered from the constitutional objectives of devolution that include recognising the 
diversity of the Kenyan people and protecting and promoting the interests of minorities 
and marginalised communities.17  
3.1. Devolution and the territorial inclusion of excluded communities  
Devolution, as an institutional mechanism for the political inclusion of ethnic 
communities, has a territorial aspect: it entails the structuring of the sub-national 
boundaries of a country in a manner allowing the territorial accommodation of various 
ethnic communities of a country. The Constitution thus provides for the creation of 47 
counties, spread across the country, as the sub-national units of the country.18 The 
Kenyan Constitution does not in fact expressly provide that ethnicity should be a factor 
that informs the demarcation of the boundaries of the counties. The boundaries of the 
counties were however demarcated along the boundaries of the former districts which 
were largely based on the colonial districts that were demarcated along ethnic lines.19 
The boundaries of the 47 counties that were finally adopted largely correspond to the 
settlement pattern of a number of ethnic communities of the country. 
Table 2: Counties where various ethnic communities form the majority 
Ethnic communities  Counties   
Kalenjin  Uasin Gishu, Kericho, Bomet, ‘Nandi’, Baringo  
Kikuyu Kiambu, Muranga, Nyandarua, Nyeri, Kirinyaga, Nakuru, Laikipia 
Luo  Siaya, Kisumu, Migori, Homa-Bay  
Luhya Kakamega, Vihiga, Bungoma, Busia, Trans-Nzoia   
Kamba  Makueni, Machakos, Kitui  
Kisii  Kisii, Nyamira  
Meru Meru, Tharaka-Nithi  
Embu Embu  
Maasai Samburu, Narok, Kajiado  
Somali Garissa, Wajir, Mandera  
Turkana Turkana 
Borana Marsabit, Isiolo  
Waswahili, Durma, Giriama, Rabai, 
Boni, Digo, 
Mombasa  
                                                 
17 Republic of Kenya: Kenya Law Reports:  Constitution of Kenya (2010) Art 174(b). 
18 Constitution of Kenya 2010, First schedule. 
19 Bosire (2013) 257. 
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Mijikenda Kwale, Kilifi, Tana River, Lamu  
Taita Taita Taveta  
Pokot  West Pokot  
Marakwet  Elgeyo Marakwet  
Mixed  Nairobi  
  
Source: Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 (2010) 
The Kenyan devolved system – unlike, for instance, the Ethiopian federal system that 
encloses each of the five largest ethnic communities of the country within a single 
region20 - does not attempt to create a single mega-county for each ethnic community. It 
rather divides the ethnic communities with large populations into several counties. The 
division of the larger ethnic communities into several counties is meant to territorially 
accommodate the ethnic diversity of Kenyans without balkanising the country into 
ethnic enclaves. The end result of this arrangement is that one or more counties have 
been created where an ethnic community, including some of those hitherto excluded 
communities, forms a majority. As can be seen from Table 2 above each county has a 
single ethnic community constituting a majority. Some of the counties in fact bear the 
names of hitherto excluded communities - including Turkana, Pokot, Taita Taveta and 
Samburu. The exceptions are two counties, Nairobi and Mombasa, which have no single 
ethnic community that is in the majority. There are other counties, such as, Isiolo, Lamu, 
Marsabit and Tana River, which are also said not to have an absolute majority ethnic 
community. Nakuru, Laikipia and Trans Nzoia counties, are predominately populated by 
people from communities that ancestrally hail from other counties. This territorial 
arrangement can be assumed to bring about a sense of ownership to the relevant 
communities.  
     Moreover, some of the former provinces were considered to belong to specific 
ethnic communities, and other communities were considered outsiders. This perception 
had been used as an excuse to evict people based on their ethnic identity from some 
areas in Kenya. For example, the former Rift Valley Province was considered to belong 
to the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and the Samburu communities leading to the formation 
of the ethnic alliance of the said communities called KAMATUSA.21 Yet there are many 
belonging to the Kikuyu community who reside in some parts of the former Rift Valley 
Province. These moved to after independence by purchasing the former colonial lands 
through the Gikuyu, Meru and Embu Association (GEMA) and cooperative societies.22  
Other regions were also considered to belong to other communities. Such sense of 
ownership and the branding of other communities as “outsiders” was one of the reasons 
                                                 
20 See Fessha (2010).  
21 Star Reporter “Ruto’s plan to revive KAMATUSA” available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-
23988/rutos-plan-revive-kamatusa (accessed 2 October 2014). 
22 Nyukuri B The impact of past and potential ethnic conflicts on kenyan's stability and development A 
paper prepared for the USAID Conference on Conflict resolution in the Greater Horn of Africa June (1997) 
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.596.7855&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
(accessed 30 November 2016).  
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cited for the abolition of the semi-federal independence constitution and have over 
years contributed to the ethnic conflicts. Now some communities heretofore considered 
outsiders have become among the largest communities in some of the newly established 
counties. For example, in Nakuru and Laikipia Counties, both in the former Rift Valley 
Province, the Kikuyu have become the largest community.23  
     This territorial arrangement is not, however, without limitations. There are 
about 43 ethnic communities in Kenya, not to mention the numerous sub-tribes in these 
communities.24 However, only 16 ethnic communities form the majority in one or more 
counties. Eleven of the 16 ethnic communities form the majority in more than one 
county, while the other five, form the majority in one county each. The Kikuyu are in 
majority in seven counties followed by the Kalenjin and the Luhya, each of which is in 
the majority in five counties. Cumulatively, the 11 ethnic communities dominate 40 of 
the 47 counties. This means that out of the 43 ethnic communities, 27 are minorities at 
intra-county level. This shows that the county system has not resulted in the territorial 
inclusion of all ethnic communities. In fact, most of the ethnic communities of the 
country have now become minorities at intra-county level creating a situation similar to 
the one that existed at the national level before the devolved system was introduced. 
That is why many of those communities that currently are intra-county minorities 
protested during the drafting of the Constitution since their concerns were not catered 
for when the demarcation of the boundaries of the counties took place.25   Moreover, the 
creation of a county for a particular ethnic community on its own is not a sufficient 
factor to create among members of the Kenyan ethnic communities a sense of being 
included in government.  Representation in the national government is still viewed as 
the single most critical factor in terms of evaluating the inclusiveness of the government 
in Kenya.26  
3.2 County political institutions and inclusiveness  
Under the former centralised system of government, the National Assembly was the 
only representative institution in the country that had political relevance. There were 
indeed elected local councillors.27 They had however restricted political significance. 
The local councils, for example, did not have constitutionally assigned legislative and 
revenue raising and allocation powers. Members of Parliament (MPs) were elected from 
210 very large constituencies. This limited the opportunities that small ethnic 
communities had for political representation. Even those that were represented were 
outnumbered in this representative assembly. This exclusion was further exacerbated 
                                                 
23 Horowitz J “Ethnic groups and campaign strategy in Kenya’s 2007 election” (University of California, 
San Diego) (2009) available at 
http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/wgape/17_Horowitz.pdf  (accessed 30 November 
2016). 
24 The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) Population and Housing Census, 2009 available at  
 http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=109:population-
and-housing-census-2009&Itemid=599 (accessed 20 August, 2015). 
25  Nation Reporter “Draft: MPs seek more counties for marginal groups” Daily Nation 1 March 2010.   
26 Bosire (2013) 257. 
27 Bosire (2013) 124. 
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by the formalisation of a one-party-system in 1982 - that was de facto in place since 
1969 – until it was abolished in 1991. Moreover, the only existing executive organ was 
the National Cabinet, which, as Table 1 shows, was composed of 20 to 30 individuals, 
often hailing from the largest 10 or so ethnic communities. The small ethnic 
communities were thus seldom represented in these political institutions leaving them 
with a sense of exclusion. 
      The 2010 Constitution, on the other hand, through devolution, creates multiple 
political institutions at two levels of government, among others, for the purpose of 
enhancing the political inclusion of the various ethnic communities of the country. It 
provides for the establishment of political institutions not only at national level but also 
at county level. Each county has a representative council, a County Assembly, which is 
composed of directly elected, and “nominated”, representatives.28 Each county also has 
an executive organ referred to as the county executive committee (CEC) composed of a 
directly elected governor and deputy governor and other members appointed by the 
governor with the approval of the County Assembly.29 The governor and his deputy are 
the chief executive and deputy chief executive of the county, respectively.30  
  The total number of the seats in County Assemblies exceeds 145031. There are 
also hundreds of executive offices that have been established in each county. These, 
obviously, open up a wide political space for the inclusion of many ethnic communities 
of the country. Each county also has its own administrative apparatus and an 
independent County Public Service Board (CPSB) to assist the county executive in the 
recruitment of the county administration staff.32 Civil servants hailing from different 
ethnic communities are expected to fill these administrative vacancies. This is an 
important departure from the previous centralised system where a single civil service 
system existed which, especially the senior management level, was dominated by 
people from just a few ethnic communities. The creation of so many political and 
administrative institutions at county and national levels in and of itself creates a wide 
political space for the inclusion of hitherto excluded communities.  
     The Constitution does not stop at creating the political institutions. It goes 
further and provides several principles requiring the representation in these 
institutions of hitherto excluded communities. It requires that the composition of the 
political organs of a county reflects the community and cultural diversity of its 
residents33 even though the effective implementation of this principle is dependent on 
political parties.  It also requires Parliament to enact legislation that gives effect to this 
constitutional principle.34 Accordingly Parliament enacted the County Government Act 
                                                 
28 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 176(1). 
29 Constitution of Kenya 2010  179(2)(b). 
30 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 179(4). 
31 This is indeed a reduction in number of elected representatives compared to the former 5000 or so 
elected local authorities. However, as will be discussed below, members of the county assemblies have 
more political powers and significance. 
32 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art (235)(a). 
33 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 90 (2)(c). 
34 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 197(2)(a). 
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(CGA) of 2012, which contains several provisions requiring ethnic inclusion in the 
political institutions of counties.  
      The Constitution adopts the First Past the Post (FPTP) system as the principal 
electoral system through which the great majority of members of County Assemblies 
are elected. 35  A County Assembly is thus composed of members elected from wards 
within a county that serve as single member electoral constituencies in county 
elections.36 However, under the FPTP system there is a possibility that members of an 
ethnic community may not be politically represented unless they are found to be in the 
majority in one or more electoral districts (wards) of a county, particularly where 
ethnicity is the major factor in determining who gets elected.37  The electoral system 
may thus result in the exclusion of, particularly, people from intra-county minority 
ethnic communities from political representation. Moreover, the Independent Electoral 
Boundaries Commission (IEBC) did not take the ethnic factor into consideration when 
creating wards that serve as electoral constituencies. Population size was the principal 
factor that IEBC took into account for this purpose. This was challenged in court in 
Republic v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another Ex-Parte 
Councillor Eliot Lidubwi Kihusa & 5 others. The Court stated that the wards, which serve 
as electoral constituents in county elections, need, where possible, to be delimited in a 
manner that allows the representation of intra-county minority ethnic communities.38 
      The FPTP electoral system is further complemented by a system that is meant to 
allow the representation of special groups, such as, women and other marginalised 
social groups, including marginalised ethnic communities within a county.39  The CGA of 
2012 requires that six members be chosen by political parties to represent the 
marginalised groups. 40 However, the Elections Act (2011) provides for four names, 
which is the number that was used in 2013, as per section 7(3) of the CGA, to represent 
the marginalised groups, including the marginalised communities. 41 The Elections Act, 
further, requires political parties to nominate eight people for the positions from either 
person with disability (PWD) or youths, four for each group.42 Article 36(3) of the 
Elections Act, further affirms that priority should be given to the above categories but 
                                                 
35 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 177(1)(a). 
36 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 177(1)(a). 
37 The FPTP seeks to identify winners in electoral contestations rather than ensuring, unlike the 
Proportional Representation (PR) system, the equitable representation of all social groups. FPTP may 
thus be exclusionary. It may however allow the representation of a certain ethnic community in a sub-
national assembly if members of the community are found in one or more the electoral districts of the 
sub-national unit. Wolff S “Electoral-systems design and power-sharing regimes” in O’Flynn I & Russell D 
(eds) Power sharing: New challenges for divided societies London: Pluto Press (2005) 62. 
38 Republic v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another Ex-Parte Councillor Eliot 
Lidubwi Kihusa & 5 others [2012] eKLR p 144. 
39 Constitution of Kenya 2010 S 177(1)(c). In the case of marginalised groups, their number is left for 
national legislation to determine and even though only persons with disabilities (PWDs) and youths are 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the list is not exhaustive as the Constitution uses the word  
“including”. 
40 Republic of Kenya: Kenya Gazette Supplement County Government Act (CGA) No 17 (2012) Sec 7(1)(a). 
41 Republic of Kenya: Laws of Kenya: Elections Act (EA) (2011) S 36(8). 
42 EA S 36(1) (f). 
ETHNIC COMMUNITIES UNDER KENYA’S DEVOLVED SYSTEM 
 
Page | 141  
 
also introduces a possibility for the representation of ‘any other marginalised group’ 
category. The IEBC General Guidelines to political parties on the nomination for the 
special seats, like the Constitution,43 exempts the members of county assemblies special 
list from the need to reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya.44 In 
its Specific Guidelines, however, it requires that out of the eight nominees for special 
seats, there should be two seats each for the PWD, the youth and the marginalised 
groups. The excluded ethnic communities fall under the third category. The number of 
nominees that a political party may have for the special seats is however dependent on 
its performance in the normal electoral process. The better it performs the larger the 
number of nominees it can forward for the special seats. This arrangement is clearly 
skewed in favour of parties that are supported by the larger ethnic communities and 
disfavours those supported by smaller communities.     
      Furthermore, the Constitution - by requiring that a county executive reflects the 
“community and cultural diversity” of the county - implicitly requires the political 
inclusion of all ethnic communities of a county in the appointment of members of the 
CEC.45 The CGA, enacted by Parliament, thus requires county governors to ensure that 
their executive committees represent the community and cultural diversity of their 
respective counties.46 The Act further authorises the County Assemblies to reject the list 
of nomination submitted by a county governor if it is not inclusive of the ethnic 
diversity of the county.47 
 3.3. Political parties and ethnic inclusion 
Kenya’s political parties historically have been organised along ethnic lines, despite 
purporting to promote a national agenda and to have a national outlook. In the past 
political parties have been used to divide Kenyans along ethnic lines, resulting in the 
exclusion of several ethnic communities.48 With a view to curtailing the political 
exclusion of ethnic communities, the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 puts some 
restrictions on ethnic mobilisation by political parties.  
      The Constitution expressly states that political parties cannot be formed along 
ethnic lines and that they should have a national outlook.49 Article 91 of the Constitution 
further requires political parties, among others, to respect the right of all persons to 
participate in the political process, including minorities and marginalised groups.50 This 
clearly means political parties are expected to be inclusive of all ethnic communities of 
the country.  
                                                 
43 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 90(c). 
44 Independent Election and Boundary Commission (IEBC) “Party list formula and submission rules” 
available at http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/media-center/press-releases/item/party-list-formula-
and-submission-rules?category_id=7 (accessed 26 October 2014). 
45 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 197(2)(a). 
46 CGA S 35(1). 
47 CGA S 35(2)(b). 
48 Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (2008), 216. 
49 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 91(2)(a). 
50 Constitution of Kenya 2010 Art 91(e). 
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    With a view to giving effect to this and other constitutional principles, the 
Political Parties Act (PPA) of 2011 was enacted. The Act requires that in order to be 
registered, a political party should have not less than 1000 registered voters from more 
than half of the 47 counties.51 Moreover, the list of voters is required to reflect the 
regional and ethnic balance and representation of minorities and marginalised groups.52 
The Act further requires that the composition of the political party’s governing body 
should reflect, among others, regional and ethnic diversity. To this effect, Schedule 2 of 
the Act requires that the ethnic affiliations of members of a political party be indicated 
as part of the registration process.53 As will be discussed below, this legal measure has 
not prevented the organisation of political parties along ethnic lines. Moreover, section 
7(2) of the CGA requires political parties to ensure that “community and cultural 
diversity of the county is reflected in the county assembly” It further requires them to 
ensure the “adequate representation” of, and to protect, “minorities within the county in 
accordance with Article 197 of the Constitution”.  
 4 THE 2013 ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL INCLUSION OF ETHNIC 
COMMUNITIES  
The above shows that the 2010 Kenyan Constitution not only recognises that Kenya’s 
political history is replete with ethnic-based political exclusion but also seeks to curb 
this trend. To this effect, not only does it recognise the ethnic diversity of the Kenyan 
people, it also contains several provisions that are meant to ensure the political 
inclusion of hitherto excluded ethnic communities. It creates 47 counties, thereby 
territorially accommodating several ethnic communities, even though at the same time 
creating intra-county ethnic minorities. It creates various political institutions at county 
level, thereby widening the opportunities that all ethnic communities have for political 
representation. Furthermore, the Constitution requires that political parties should be 
inclusive of, among others, the various ethnic communities of the country and that the 
composition of the political institutions of the counties should reflect the ethnic 
diversity in the relevant counties.  
    Two-and-a-half years after the adoption of the new Constitution, general 
elections were held. The President, members of the National Assembly and the Senate, 
members of County Assemblies, county governors and deputy governors were elected 
in these elections. Over 50 political parties - independently or organised under different 
coalitions - took part in the elections. The question is whether the constitutional 
promise of ethnic inclusiveness has found practical expression in the 2013 elections. In 
order to answer this question, the following section will first identify the ethnic 
alignment of the political parties followed by an analysis of the 2013 election results.  
                                                 
51 Republic of Kenya: Laws of Kenya: Political Parties Act (PPA) (2011) S 7(2)(a). 
52 PPA S 7(2)(b). 
53 PPA Schedule 2(6)(e). 
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 4.1 THE ETHNIC ALIGNMENT OF KENYA’S POLITICAL PARTIES   
It is difficult to ascertain the ethnic affiliation of each of the over 1 450 MCAs, even 
though one may conjecture about that, based on the names of the MCAs and the area 
from which they were elected.  It is however possible to gain a general picture of the 
ethnic inclusiveness of the devolved system by looking into the core ethnic support base 
of the political parties that have won seats in County Assemblies. It is common 
knowledge that Kenya’s political parties are personalised in the sense that they are 
organised around prominent political figures whose core political support bases are the 
ethnic communities to which they belong.54 This is so despite the constitutional 
requirement that political parties should have a national outlook and composition. 
Moreover several studies show that Kenyans tend to vote largely as “ethnic blocks”.55 It 
is thus imperative to go beyond the veil of “national outlook” and examine the support 
base of the political parties in order to gain a clear picture of the extent of the ethnic 
inclusiveness of the counties’ political institutions. Given the ethnic alignment of 
Kenya’s political parties, one can make a general assumption that the larger the number 
of political parties that are represented in a county assembly, the larger the number of 
ethnic communities likely to have been represented in the County Assembly.  
       As was mentioned above, over 50 political parties contested the 2013 Kenyan 
general elections. These parties were either members of one of the three major 
coalitions or informally lend and receive support from the three coalitions. The three 
major coalitions, which are composed of over 20 smaller political parties, are the 
Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), the Jubilee Coalition, and the Amani 
Coalition. The CORD is composed of more than 10 political parties. The Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM), Wiper Democratic Movement of Kenya (WDM-K) and 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy- Kenya (FORD-Kenya) are the most important 
members of the CORD.56 The Jubilee Coalition is formally made up of four political 
parties: the National Alliance (TNA), the National Rainbow Coalition (NRC), the United 
Republican Party (URP), and the Republican Congress (RC). The Amani Coalition has 
three, main, political parties as its members: New Ford Kenya, United Democratic 
Forum (UDF), and Kenya African National Congress (KANU). 
      Each of the political parties, constituting the three coalitions, is organised around 
a prominent political figure who garners political support and votes principally from 
his/her own ethnic community. According to Otele and Etyang, the five major political 
parties, which control 70 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, received votes, 
                                                 
54 Kadima D &  Owuor F “Kenya’s decade of experiments with political alliances and coalitions” (2014) 13 
(1) Journal of African Elections 150. See also Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) (2010) Institutionalizing 
political parties in Kenya Nairobi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) (2010). 
55 Bratton M &  Kimenyi MS Voting in Kenya: Putting ethnicity in perspective Economics Working Papers. 
Paper 200809 (2008). Available at http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ_wpapers/200809 (accessed 
24 November 2016). 
56 The other members of the coalition include The Independent Party, KADDU-Asili, Peoples Democratic 
Party, Mkenya Solidarity Movement, Chama Cha Uzalendo, Muungano Development Movement Party of 
Kenya, United Democratic Movement, Chama Cha Mwananchi, Federal Party of Kenya, Labour Party of 
Kenya. 
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principally, from counties belonging to the ethnic communities of the leaders of the 
parties. 57  For instance, Uhuru Kenyatta, Charity Ngilu and William Ruto head the TNA, 
NARC and URP, respectively, of the Jubilee Coalition. Uhuru is from the Kikuyu 
community while Ruto and Ngilu are from the Kalenjin and Kamba communities, 
respectively. In the 2013 presidential elections, Uhuru received his major support from 
the Kikuyu community and Kikuyu dominated counties such as Kiambu, Muranga, Nyeri, 
Kirinyaga, and Nyandarua.58 Presumably because of his alliance with Ruto, a Kalenjin, 
Uhuru also received many votes from the Kalenjin counties of Uasin Gishu, Nandi, 
Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, Bomet and Kericho.   Similarly, Raila Odinga, Kalonzo 
Musyoka, and Moses Wetangula head the ODM, WDM-K, and FORD-Kenya, respectively 
the three principal members of CORD. Odinga’s major support came from Luo counties 
including Kisumu, Migori, Homabay and Siaya. His alliance with Kalonzo Musyoka, a 
Kamba, also brought Odinga votes from the Kamba counties of Machakos, Kitui and 
Makueni. It should be noted though that in several instances, Odinga received significant 
votes outside his Luo base, in his own right, as in the coastal region of Kenya. The leader 
of UDF, Musalia Mudavadi, received most votes from his Luhya community, a reflection 
of his party’s support base.59  
     The above does not however mean that each of the existing political parties 
receives support exclusively from a single ethnic community. This is not even legally 
permissible since, as was mentioned above, the Constitution requires each political 
party to be inclusive of diverse ethnic communities.     
4.2 Ethnic inclusion in County Assemblies  
As mentioned above, the Jubilee and the CORD are the two major coalitions in Kenya. 
The presidential candidates of these two coalitions received approximately 94 percent 
of all the votes cast in the 2013 presidential elections.60 The Jubilee Coalition managed 
to win the presidential elections and, therefore, the CORD lost the presidency. In the 
absence of the sub-national political structures, the CORD - with all the political parties 
constituting it and the ethnic communities supporting them– would have remained with 
little political influence in the country’s political life considering they are in a minority 
in the National Assembly. 
     Thanks to the devolved system of the country, the CORD became the ruling party 
in more counties than the Jubilee, even though the latter had won the presidency.  
Political parties belonging to the CORD Coalition now control 24 of the 47 counties, 
including Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. Members of the Jubilee Coalition are in control of 
                                                 
57 Otele O M  & Etyang O  “Institutionalisation of political parties? A reflection on the 2013 elections in 
Kenya” 2014 3 (3) Research Journal in Organizational Psychology and Educational Studies 141. 
58 Otele & Etyang (2014) 141. 
59 Independent Election and Boundary Commission (IEBC) General election results and CAW nominee list 
files (2013) available at http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/component/search/? 
searchword=2013+election+result&ordering=&searchphrase=all (accessed 26 March 2015). 
60 IEBC (2013). 
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the rest, 23 counties.61  Moreover, TNA, the core party of the Jubilee Coalition, controls 
the majority seats in 9 County Assemblies, while the ODM and URP control the majority 
seats in 8 and 7 counties respectively.  The Wiper and UDF each form a majority in a 
single county. These political parties form a majority, mainly, in the counties where 
their core ethnic support base also forms a majority. For instance, as can be seen in 
Table 3 below, the TNA, whose core support base is the Kikuyu community, controls the 
majority seats of the assemblies of seven Kikuyu dominated counties: Nyandarua, Nyeri, 
Kirinyaga, Muranga, Kiambu, Laikipia and Nakuru. The other two are Embu County, 
dominated by the Embu, an ethnic community closely related to the Kikuyu, and Kajiado 
County, dominated by the Maasai, but has a sizable Kikuyu population as well. The URP, 
whose core support base is the Kalenjin ethnic community, controls the majority seats 
of the assemblies of the six Kalenjin dominated counties: Bomet, Kericho, Baringo, 
Nandi, Elgeyo-Marakwet, and Uasin Gishu.62 UDF, a political party whose support base 
is considered to be the Luhya community, forms a majority in Vihiga, a Luhya 
dominated county, and the home county of its leader. This is also the case with the 
Wiper Party, whose major support base is the Kamba community and forms a majority 
in Kitui County, a Kamba dominated county and the home county of its party leader, 
Kalonzo Musyoka. From this, one may safely assume that the devolved system has 
indeed improved the political inclusion of the ethnic communities of Kenya.  
Table 3: Political parties and the number of County Assembly seats under their control  
Political party No of MCAs No of counties  
ODM 366 34 
TNA 335 32 
URP 242 29 
SDP 3  
WIPER 131 16 
KANU 30 11 
GNU 20  
APK 21  
KNC 15  
Federal Party of Kenya  14  
NARC-K 14  
CHAMA 13  
National Vision Party  10  
Muungano Party  10  
                                                 
61 Makabila S “Why control of Kenya’s 47 governors is the next battlefront” (Standard, 4 August 2013) 
available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/print/2000090090/why-control-of-governors-is-the-next-
battlefront (accessed 23 October 2014). 
62 IEBC (2013). 
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The Independent Party  11  
UDF  59 18 
Shirikisho 3  
FORD-K 58 14 
FORD-P 8  
People’s Democratic Party  8  
Labour Party  6 2 
New Ford-K 22  
SDP 3  
Mazingira 3  
Unity Party of Kenya  4  
Democratic Party of Kenya  8  
UDM 4  
SAFINA 8  
NARC 8  
FP 3  
Progressive Party of Kenya  3  
Restore and Build Kenya 3  
Agano Party  3  
People’s Party of Kenya  3  
Mwangaza Party 2  
Saba Saba  1  
MSM 1  
Mazingira Greens Party of Kenya 1  
KENDA  1  
Party of Independent Candidates  6  
Independent Candidates  2 2 
ND 1  
KADU  6 2 
New Democrats 1  
Source: IEBC Final results 2013 
However, as can be seen from Table 3 above, the parties, which the five largest ethnic 
communities presumably support, control 74 percent (1074 of 1443) the total County 
Assembly seats.63 This shows that the political parties that are strongly supported by 
the five largest ethnic communities have secured the political control of their respective 
sub-national turfs. These communities in any case had some level of political visibility at 
                                                 
63 The other seven MCAs were either elected unopposed or their election took place on a different day. 
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the national level even under the centralised system.  Thus, one may argue, the above 
does not show that the devolved system has set a trend of an enhanced political 
inclusion as far the remaining 39 or so small and historically excluded ethnic 
communities are concerned.  
      It should, however, be noted that there are several counties where small and 
hitherto excluded communities are found in the majority. Small ethnic communities, 
such as, the Taita, the Pokot, the Orma, the Turkana, the Mijikenda, and the like, are now 
numerically dominant in one or a few more counties. These communities, being in 
majority in these counties, are in a position not only to be represented in the County 
Assemblies of their counties but also to be in control of the majority seats therein. This 
is likely to be the case regardless of the political party/parties in control of the County 
Assemblies in these counties since no political party is likely to win elections in these 
counties without fielding candidates who are affiliated to the relevant ethnic 
communities.   
      Moreover, as can be seen from Table 3 above, over 44 political parties, 
constituting over 80 percent of all the political parties in the country, are represented in 
one or more County Assemblies, even though the ODM, TNA, URP and Wiper together 
control over 74 percent of the County Assembly seats. Given the ethnic alignment of the 
political parties, coupled with the fact that the great majority of the existing political 
parties are represented in the County Assemblies, one can safely assume that a greater 
number of ethnic communities are politically represented than was the case under the 
centralised system. To this extent, the argument goes, devolution has allowed the 
political inclusion of numerous ethnic communities of the country, including those that 
were previously excluded.  
      One may however counter the above argument by indicating the existence of 
over 5000 elected local councils in the pre-2010 political dispensation, which allowed a 
more enhanced representation for small communities at the local level.  Such argument 
however ignores the political and constitutional significance the counties compared to 
the old local councils. The counties are constitutionally established subnational units 
with significant political and financial power.  The local councils on the other hand were 
deconcentrated units of the national government with little political significance.   
Table 4: County Assemblies and number of political parties represented in them  
Counties assemblies  Number of Parties  
Mombasa  1  
Nyandarua;Nyeri; Kirinyaga; Muranga; 
Uasin Gishu; Elgeyo-Marakwet; Nandi 
Laikipia; Kericho; Bomet; Siaya; Kisumu 
2-4 
Kilifi; Tana River; Taita-Taveta; Mandera 
Marsabit; Isiolo; Tharaka; Embu; Kiambu 
Turkana; Samburu; Trans-Nzoia; Baringo; Kajiado; 
Vihiga; Homabay; Nairobi 
5-7 
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Kwale; Lamu: Garissa; Kitui; Makueni 
West Pokot; Nakuru; Narok; Busia 
8-10 
Wajir; Meru; Machakos; Kakamega; Bungoma 
Migori; Kisii; Nyamira 
Above 10  
Source: IEBC Final results 2013 
Further, with the exception of the Mombasa County Assembly, no County Assembly is 
fully controlled by a single political party. Two or more political parties are represented 
in the Assemblies of the other Counties. In 21 County Assemblies, which constitute 45 
percent of all the County Assemblies, no single political party even forms a majority; a 
coalition of parties forms a majority in each of these County Assemblies. Some 12 
counties have between two and four political parties in their Assemblies. The rest of the 
counties (72 percent) have between five to 14 political parties in their Assemblies. 
Bungoma and Kisii Counties, with 14 political parties represented in their assemblies, 
have the highest number of political parties. Wajir, Meru, Machakos, and Migori 
counties, each of which has 13 political parties, follow these.  
      Given the ethnic alignment of the political parties, the representation of 
numerous political parties within each County Assembly is, at least to some extent, due 
to the representation of numerous ethnic communities in each county, including intra-
county minority ethnic communities. Thus, for example, some three members of the 
Nakuru County Assembly, belong to minority groups of the county. In Kiambu, an 
individual from an intra-county minority community has been elected to the County 
Assembly. Likewise, three individuals from intra-county minority ethnic groups have 
been elected into the Uasin Gishu County Assembly representing three different 
political parties.64  
     Furthermore, wards, which are often small and relatively ethnically 
homogenous, are used as electoral constituencies in county elections. In Kenya, where 
voters are mobilised along ethnic lines, a political party is less likely to win county 
elections in a given ward unless it fields a candidate belonging to the ethnic community 
that is in the majority in the ward. The existing political parties thus have no choice but 
to create alliances with different political figures from within such community. The 
political figures provide endorsement of the one or  other of the strongest parties and 
the political parties recruit these political figures as their members and field them as 
candidates in the wards where the relevant ethnic communities are found to be in the 
majority.  
     The above is clearly apparent in the county elections results. As can be seen from 
Table 4, a small number of political parties is represented in the Assemblies of the 
counties where the largest five or so ethnic communities are in the majority. These 
include the political party that the respective ethnic community is assumed to support, 
and fewer than five other political parties are represented in these County Assemblies. 
Moreover, the seat distribution shows that the dominant parties in the assemblies of 
                                                 
64 IEBC (2013). 
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these counties control the great majority of the seats leaving only a handful of seats to 
the other parties. On the other hand there is a great diversity of political parties in the 
Assemblies of the counties where smaller ethnic communities, or those that do not have 
a single strong political party, are dominant. This is an indication of the fact that 
members of the small communities, or those from communities without a single strong 
political party, run for elections as candidates of one or other of the strongest political 
parties or supporting preferred presidential candidates of the bigger political parties. In 
the process, the votes of members of such ethnic communities are divided among the 
different political parties. .  
     While it is clear that the newly introduced devolved system and the 2013 
election show a positive trend of greater ethnic inclusion, it nonetheless does not mean 
that the majority-minority political tension has been resolved.  As has been stated 
above, almost each county has an ethnic community that is in the majority and several 
others that constitute the minority. The largest five ethnic communities form the 
majority in most of the counties. This means that the majority-minority tension is bound 
to resurface at county level. Moreover, in Kenya’s political culture where ethnic identity 
and political loyalty often converge, the representation of intra-county minority ethnic 
communities by one or a few more members of a County Assembly, despite having an 
important symbolic value for previously excluded communities, does not allow the 
community to significantly influence policies and legislation. 
4.3 COUNTY EXECUTIVES AND ETHNIC INCLUSION  
As mentioned above, under the centralised system, Kenyan politics was such that those 
from small communities had a slim opportunity to rise to the national leadership.  
Devolution, through the creation of the offices of a governor and a deputy governor and 
other executive positions at the county level, presents a significant opportunity of 
political inclusion, for those from hitherto excluded communities to have access to 
political positions.  
Table 5: Political parties and counties won (governorship). Coalitions based on post-
election re-alignments 
Political party 
and coalition  
Counties won  
ODM (CORD) Kisii, Nyamira, Nairobi, Homabay, Kisumu, Siaya, Busia, Kakamega, Kajiado, 
Turkana, Wajir, Marsabit, Taita-Taveta, Kilifi,Kwale, Mombasa, 
WDM-K (CORD) Tana River, Garissa, Kitui, Machakos 
UDF (Jubilee) Lamu 
URP (Jubilee)  Mandera, Isiolo, Samburu, Uasin Gishu, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Nandi,Baringo, Narok, 
Kericho, Bomet  
APK (Jubilee)  Meru  
TNA (Jubilee)  Tharaka, Embu, Nyandarua, Kirinyaga, Muranga, Kiambu, Laikipia, Nakuru  
MP   (CORD) Makueni 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 20 (2016) 
Page | 150  
 
GNU (Jubilee)  Nyeri 
Kanu (Jubilee)  West Pokot 
FORD-K (CORD) Trans-Nzoia 
PPK (CORD) Vihiga 
NFK (Jubilee)  Bungoma 
PDP (CORD)  Migori 
Source: IEBC Final results 2013 
A close look at the 2013 election results shows that 14 political parties control the 
offices of governor and deputy governor in different counties. In 16 of the 47 counties, 
the ODM has control of these two executive offices, followed by URP and TNA, each of 
which control these executive offices in 10 and 8 counties and WDM-K, which controls 4 
counties.  Small political parties, such as, FORD-K, PPK, MP and PDP (both members of 
the CORD Coalition), UDF, NFK, KANU, APK, and GNU (members of the Jubilee Coalition) 
control these offices in a single county each. One can safely assume that given the ethnic 
alignment of the Kenyan political parties, the fact that 13 political parties are in charge 
of the governorship and deputy governorship offices in different counties is likely to 
have allowed the political inclusion of a larger number of ethnic communities than 
would have been the case under the centralised system.   
     This is not a mere conjecture. A close look at the ethnic background of governors 
shows that the governorship in 23 counties went to individuals belonging to ethnic 
communities that were either excluded from, or inadequately represented in, national 
politics including the Turkana, the Somali, the Coastal people, the Maasai, the Kisii, and 
the like. Moreover, in some cases the individuals holding the governorship and deputy 
governorship are not from the same ethnic community. For instance, the governors and 
deputy governors of Lamu, Migori, Trans Nzoia, Embu, Busia, Bungoma, Isiolo, Nakuru, 
Nairobi and Marsabit are from different ethnic communities. While almost in all cases 
county governors are from the ethnic communities forming the majority in the 
respective counties, the deputy governors, in most cases, but not always, are held by 
individuals belonging to the second largest ethnic communities in the counties. The 
motive for this is not always a benign need of ensuring the political inclusion of hitherto 
excluded communities. It is rather a political calculation intended to gain political 
support from different ethnic communities. Nonetheless, it has brought about the 
inclusion of a larger number of ethnic communities.  As already stated earlier, there is a 
statutory requirement to the effect that the appointment of members of a CEC take into 
consideration the need to ensure the representation of the various ethnic communities 
within a county. Failing that, a County Assembly may refuse to approve the nominees 
for the position.   
      However, a look at the ethnic composition of the executive committees of many 
counties shows not all ethnic communities in counties are represented in most cases.65 
                                                 
65 National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) Ethnic & diversity audit of the county public 
service (2016). Available at 
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The governor of the Nakuru County, for instance, appointed, of the ten members of the 
CEC, four from the Kikuyu community, three from the Kalenjin community, and one 
each from the Luo, Kisii and Meru communities. Thus, despite having more than 10 
ethnic communities in the county, seven of the ten positions in the CEC of this county 
are held by individuals belonging to just two ethnic communities with none from five 
ethnic communities. In Laikipia County, individuals belonging to the Kikuyu community 
comprise four of the eight members of the county CEC while a single individual 
represents each of the Samburu, Maasai, Turkana, and Kalenjin communities. This 
means only five of the, at least, 12 ethnic communities in the county are represented in 
this county executive committee. The ethnic inclusiveness of Laikipia CEC, thus, became 
a matter of litigation in the case of Mathew Lempurkel v Joshua Wakahora Irungu County 
Governor, Laikipia County & 2 others.66 The petitioner claimed that the respondent had 
violated section 35(1) of the County Government Act67 by failing to elect a person from 
the Samburu community to the Laikipia’s CEC, although the Samburu community 
constitutes a substantial minority in the county. The Act requires that the CEC should 
reflect the community and cultural diversity of the county as much as possible. The 
petitioner also relied on Articles 10 and 232 of the Constitution, which emphasise 
inclusiveness and protection of marginalised ethnic communities.  
     Tana River County, which in the past experienced several violent ethnic conflicts, 
has several ethnic communities including the Pokomo, Orma, Wardei, Malakote, 
Munyoyaya, Akamba, Bajuni and Kikuyu. The Governor of this county appointed the 
nine members of the CEC from only the Pokomo, Orma, and Wardei communities 
leaving the other unrepresented. A resident in the county thus filed a case in court 
claiming lack of ethnic inclusiveness in the CEC in Republic v Tana River County Assembly 
& 2 others.68 The Court ruled that the list did not comply with Article 197(2) of the 
Constitution, which is about the need for the Committee to reflect the county cultural 
diversity in the county. The court also ruled that the governor had failed to observe 
Article 10 on the national principles and values of inclusiveness, Articles 174 of the 
Constitution on the objects of devolution, which includes recognition, protection and 
promotion of minorities and marginalized communities, and section 35 of the CGA. The 
latter requires the governor and the County Assemblies to ensure that the minorities 
and marginalised communities are properly included and that affirmative action is 
taken to ensure that people from such communities qualify for the appointments as 
stated in Article 56 of the constitution. 
      Likewise, Bungoma County, which has more than six ethnic communities 
including the Bukusu, Batura, Tachoni, Teso, Sabout, and Bongomek, was also taken to 
court in the case of John Mining Temoi & another v Governor of Bungoma County & 17 
others69 over the lack of ethnic inclusiveness in its County Chief Officers appointment. 
                                                                                                                                                        
https://www.cohesion.or.ke/images/downloads/Ethnic%20and%20Diversity%20Audit%20of%20the%
20County%20Public%20Service%202016.pdf (accessed 28 September 2016). 
66 Mathew Lempurkel v Joshua Wakahora Irungu County Governor, Laikipia County & 2 others [2013] eKLR. 
67 Act No. 17 of 2012. 
68 Republic v Tana River County Assembly & 2 others [2014] eKLR. 
69 John Mining Temoi & another v Governor of Bungoma County & 17 others [2014] eKLR. 
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The issue was that the Bongomek community was not represented in any county 
administration. The Court ruled that the Bongomek community was among the 
marginalised communities that needed representation.70  
     Lastly, in Marsabit County, which has over 14 ethnic communities, its ten CEC 
slots were divided among individuals from the Borana, Gabra, Rendille, Burji, Garre and 
Asharaf communities. Even though this appears to be a balanced representation, the 
late 2013 Marsabit conflicts were allegedly caused, among others, by the lack of ethnic 
inclusion in the county.71 
5 CONCLUSION  
Kenya has been under an extremely centralised government system for over half a 
century that resulted in the political and economic exclusion of many ethnic 
communities while bringing about inequitable political and economic benefits to a few 
individuals hailing from specific ethnic communities.  The 2010 Constitution has thus 
introduced a devolved system, among others, with the purpose of doing away with such 
political system and culture of exclusion.   
     The 2010 Constitution recognises the ethnic diversity of the Kenyan people. It 
also provides, at least implicitly, territorial and non-territorial institutional mechanisms 
for the purpose of ensuring their equitable political inclusion. It provides for the 
creation of 47 counties as autonomous sub-national territorial and political units. In 
some of the counties previously excluded ethnic communities now form majority. The 
Constitution also creates over 1400 representative positions and hundreds of executive 
offices at sub-national level. These have enhanced the opportunities that each ethnic 
community has for political representation. The Constitution requires political parties 
to have “a national outlook” which requires them to be ethnically inclusive.  The 
composition of County Assemblies and some of the executives, which were formed after 
the 2013 elections, the first elections after the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, also 
demonstrates a certain level ethnic inclusiveness.  
     Yet the problems associated with ethnic based political exclusion of minorities 
are far from resolved. The very devolved system, which is meant to resolve this 
quandary, has created new minorities almost in all counties. Indeed, there are enhanced 
opportunities for the political representation of members of intra-county minorities. 
Yet, they are still at the mercy of the community that is in the majority in terms of 
crafting policies and legislation on social and economic matters that are beneficial for 
their communities. This includes access to job opportunities at the county government 
for members of the minority communities, especially those that are politically in the 
opposition. Moreover, some of the intra-county minorities are from communities that 
                                                 
70 The Bongomek community has a population of 3 704 out of a population of over two million in 
Bungoma County according to the 2009 Population and Housing Census Report. 
71Mohamud N & Mosley J “Insecurity in northern Kenya: Is the government losing its grip?” (African 
Argument, 6 January 2014) available at http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/06/insecurity-in-
northern-kenya-is-the-government-losing-its-grip-by-nuur-mohamud-sheekh-and-jason-mosley/ 
(accessed 6 October 2014). 
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ancestrally hail from other counties and are often found territorially dispersed 
throughout a county. There is no institutional guarantee that members of such ethnic 
communities are politically included. Furthermore, the national executive still retains a 
significant political and economic clout and hitherto excluded communities are not 
necessarily guaranteed representation in it. Other challenges include the difficulty of 
determining what constitutes an ethnic community with the purpose of ensuring ethnic 
inclusion in both national and county governments, considering that there are more 
than 100 tribes and sub-tribes and even clans at the county level. In addition, there is a 
problem of how to assign the people that do not care to which ethnic community they 
belong or those that belong to several ethnic communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
